Lesson 7a - Hitler's Rise to Power
Hitler's rise to power provides us with the model with which all authoritarian states are compared. For example, the clear distinction between the rise to power of the Nazis through the democratic elections which resulted in Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, is usefully contrasted with the consolidation of power (especially gleichschaltung) which occured after the Reichstag Fire. This turning point is not always as clear in other case studies.
|
Structure - Structural factors refer to the context that makes the rise to power of an authoritarian state more likely. As with all the most significant events in history, there is a tendency to require an explanation that goes to the roots of the problem. (cf. WWI) The problem with Hitler is that it is easy to get bogged down in the events of post-war Germany and the biographical psycho-history of Hitler's personality. But as Hitler's biographer Alun Bullock says 'Hitler may well have gone to his death as a bore in a bar' were it not for the socio-economic situation that made people willing to listen to the 'ideas of a crank' (see the classic 1980s video right - The fatal attraction of Adolf Hitler - orator).
|
|
By 1924 Hitler's political career looked over and in the 1924 and 1928 elections the Nazi's made little impact with the voters. It was the onset of the depession from 1929 that changed everything.
Political factors
As in Italy in 1919, post-war Weimar Germany was a young model democracy devised from the pages of a politics textbook. Students are often encouraged to identify potential weaknesses in the fact the electoral system of proportional representation (PR) allowed smaller extremist political parties like the Nazis to have a national voice and that Article 48 of the constitution allowed the president to rule by decree without the consent of the Reichstag (parliament), but the reality is that the political system only really began to fail after the onset of the Depression in 1930 (see below). It is true that, just as in Italy, post-war Germany also shared many of the characteristics of what we now call a 'failed state'. From the aborted communist (Spartacist) revolution of January 1919, through the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 and culminating in the failed Nazi Beer-Hall Putsch in Munich November 1923, post-war Weimar democracy struggled to survive. But it did survive, despite 'weak' PR induced coalition governments and presidents Ebert and von Hindenburg both using infamous Article 48. Under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann and the 1920s economic boom, Weimer Germany in 1928 looked anything but a failed state. The important structural political causes are ultimately to be found in the lack of democratic traditions (see cultural factors below) that weakened the democratic institutions and in a rise in extremist parties after 1929 who were characterised by their rejection of democratic norms. The political crisis of the 1930s in which no Chancellor could command a majority in the Reichstag had less to do with the proportional electoral system and was more a simple reflection of the fact that people stopped voting for democratic parties. If we are going to identify the most important political causes of Hitler's rise to power, they are to be found less in the underlying structural weaknesses of the constitution and more in the actions of the political elites in the period immediately before 1933 who helped Hitler into power. (see human agency below).
As in Italy in 1919, post-war Weimar Germany was a young model democracy devised from the pages of a politics textbook. Students are often encouraged to identify potential weaknesses in the fact the electoral system of proportional representation (PR) allowed smaller extremist political parties like the Nazis to have a national voice and that Article 48 of the constitution allowed the president to rule by decree without the consent of the Reichstag (parliament), but the reality is that the political system only really began to fail after the onset of the Depression in 1930 (see below). It is true that, just as in Italy, post-war Germany also shared many of the characteristics of what we now call a 'failed state'. From the aborted communist (Spartacist) revolution of January 1919, through the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 and culminating in the failed Nazi Beer-Hall Putsch in Munich November 1923, post-war Weimar democracy struggled to survive. But it did survive, despite 'weak' PR induced coalition governments and presidents Ebert and von Hindenburg both using infamous Article 48. Under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann and the 1920s economic boom, Weimer Germany in 1928 looked anything but a failed state. The important structural political causes are ultimately to be found in the lack of democratic traditions (see cultural factors below) that weakened the democratic institutions and in a rise in extremist parties after 1929 who were characterised by their rejection of democratic norms. The political crisis of the 1930s in which no Chancellor could command a majority in the Reichstag had less to do with the proportional electoral system and was more a simple reflection of the fact that people stopped voting for democratic parties. If we are going to identify the most important political causes of Hitler's rise to power, they are to be found less in the underlying structural weaknesses of the constitution and more in the actions of the political elites in the period immediately before 1933 who helped Hitler into power. (see human agency below).
Socio-economic factors
Social division is concerned with how divisions between groups of people in society make it difficult for the state to peacefully manage a community of competing interests. Germany's society was deeply stratified along class lines, with significant disparities in wealth, privilege, and opportunity. Germany's regional diversity and disparities in economic development contributed to social divisions within the country. The Nazi Party found support in both urban and rural areas, but its strongest support base was often in economically depressed regions, such as the industrial Ruhr Valley, where unemployment and social dislocation were particularly acute. The interwar period also witnessed tensions between different generations, with older Germans often clinging to traditional values and institutions while younger generations embraced new ideas and ideologies. The Nazis appealed to disaffected urban youth with promises of radical change and national renewal, but also appealed to older, rural conservatives with their rejection of the perceived decadence of the Weimar era. Germany was a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, but the rise of Nazism was accompanied by increasing intolerance towards minority groups, particularly Jews, Roma, and other marginalized communities. The Nazis scapegoated these groups for Germany's social and economic problems, promoting a racist and anti-Semitic ideology that sought to exclude or eliminate perceived "undesirables" from German society. The Nazi Party exploited these social divisions by portraying itself as the champion of the "Volksgemeinschaft" (people's community) and promising to address the economic plight of ordinary workers.
When the economy is weak, the social divisions are accentuated. Again, as we saw above with the political factors, there is a tendency for students to take their explanations back to the post war period, the impact of the Teaty of Versailles and resulting hyperinflation crisis of 1923. Socio-economic factors are without doubt critical to the rise to power of the Nazis, but any analysis needs to focus on the impact of the Great Depression and not conflate it with the crisis of 1923. Germany was particularly badly hit by the global depression, because as we have seen, she was dangerously exposed to America loans that were provided (Dawes 1924, Young 1928) in order to enable Germany to pay First World War reparations. It was the Depression that created the political crisis that Weimar Germany could not resolve. There is a direct correlation between rising unemployment in Weimar Germany after 1929 and an increase in the number of votes for anti-democratic parties.
Social division is concerned with how divisions between groups of people in society make it difficult for the state to peacefully manage a community of competing interests. Germany's society was deeply stratified along class lines, with significant disparities in wealth, privilege, and opportunity. Germany's regional diversity and disparities in economic development contributed to social divisions within the country. The Nazi Party found support in both urban and rural areas, but its strongest support base was often in economically depressed regions, such as the industrial Ruhr Valley, where unemployment and social dislocation were particularly acute. The interwar period also witnessed tensions between different generations, with older Germans often clinging to traditional values and institutions while younger generations embraced new ideas and ideologies. The Nazis appealed to disaffected urban youth with promises of radical change and national renewal, but also appealed to older, rural conservatives with their rejection of the perceived decadence of the Weimar era. Germany was a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, but the rise of Nazism was accompanied by increasing intolerance towards minority groups, particularly Jews, Roma, and other marginalized communities. The Nazis scapegoated these groups for Germany's social and economic problems, promoting a racist and anti-Semitic ideology that sought to exclude or eliminate perceived "undesirables" from German society. The Nazi Party exploited these social divisions by portraying itself as the champion of the "Volksgemeinschaft" (people's community) and promising to address the economic plight of ordinary workers.
When the economy is weak, the social divisions are accentuated. Again, as we saw above with the political factors, there is a tendency for students to take their explanations back to the post war period, the impact of the Teaty of Versailles and resulting hyperinflation crisis of 1923. Socio-economic factors are without doubt critical to the rise to power of the Nazis, but any analysis needs to focus on the impact of the Great Depression and not conflate it with the crisis of 1923. Germany was particularly badly hit by the global depression, because as we have seen, she was dangerously exposed to America loans that were provided (Dawes 1924, Young 1928) in order to enable Germany to pay First World War reparations. It was the Depression that created the political crisis that Weimar Germany could not resolve. There is a direct correlation between rising unemployment in Weimar Germany after 1929 and an increase in the number of votes for anti-democratic parties.
Cultural factors
The cultural climate of post-war Germany certainly favoured the rise to power of authoritarian government. The lack of a well-established ‘participant’ or democratic political culture meant that was little understanding of or support for the sort of liberal traditions and institutions to be found elsewhere in western Europe. The street fighting between political parties that had characterised the early post-war years of the Weimar Republic never completely disappeared in the 1920s. Nazis and Communists had paramilitary wings that engaged in ritual disruption and intimidation of rival meetings that meant that elections were never completely free or fair. Many of the ruling elite of politicians and civil servants, military and business leaders who had come to prominence during the time of the Emperor and the Second Reich also had little time for democracy and feared the rise of communism. In addition, the Weimar Republic's groundbreaking developments in various artistic and intellectual fields was accompanied by a social and sexual liberation which many conservatives found deeply unsettling. Nazism was able to draw on those sentiments of nostalgia and nationalism and provide an ideological vision that combined these traditional conservative goals with a revolutionary vitalism, anti-leftism and the belief in a strong leader.
Democracies are what the Austrian–British philosopher Karl Popper called ‘open societies’, by which he meant societies that are open to and tolerant of, competing ideas and ways of living. Democracies, in theory, tolerate and even encourage minorities, because the social diversity that results is in itself a good thing. Karl Popper argued that ideological authoritarian states like Nazi Germany produce ‘closed societies’, because these ‘totalitarian ideologies’ require a quasi-religious, exclusive commitment to these ideas alone. Nazism with its messianic faith in ‘racial purity’ or Communism with its belief in the ‘historical destiny’ of the working class, were examples of what Popper called ‘historicism’; philosophies that claim to have uncovered ‘the “rhythms” or the “patterns”, the “laws” or the “trends” that underlie the evolution of history’. (Popper, The Poverty of Historicism) If an ideology claims to have uncovered the truth about the laws of historical development, if it knows there is a future utopia to be attained, there can be no place for those who get in the way of progress. Totalitarian regimes require the public to believe, and the state must be disciplined and ruthless with those ‘minorities’ who do not. Hitler’s idealist vision of a future national community (Volksgemeinschaft) could only be created at the expense of the minorities who could not belong, because as Ian Kershaw argues, ‘discriminatory feelings were built into [Hitler’s] idealism’.
The cultural climate of post-war Germany certainly favoured the rise to power of authoritarian government. The lack of a well-established ‘participant’ or democratic political culture meant that was little understanding of or support for the sort of liberal traditions and institutions to be found elsewhere in western Europe. The street fighting between political parties that had characterised the early post-war years of the Weimar Republic never completely disappeared in the 1920s. Nazis and Communists had paramilitary wings that engaged in ritual disruption and intimidation of rival meetings that meant that elections were never completely free or fair. Many of the ruling elite of politicians and civil servants, military and business leaders who had come to prominence during the time of the Emperor and the Second Reich also had little time for democracy and feared the rise of communism. In addition, the Weimar Republic's groundbreaking developments in various artistic and intellectual fields was accompanied by a social and sexual liberation which many conservatives found deeply unsettling. Nazism was able to draw on those sentiments of nostalgia and nationalism and provide an ideological vision that combined these traditional conservative goals with a revolutionary vitalism, anti-leftism and the belief in a strong leader.
Democracies are what the Austrian–British philosopher Karl Popper called ‘open societies’, by which he meant societies that are open to and tolerant of, competing ideas and ways of living. Democracies, in theory, tolerate and even encourage minorities, because the social diversity that results is in itself a good thing. Karl Popper argued that ideological authoritarian states like Nazi Germany produce ‘closed societies’, because these ‘totalitarian ideologies’ require a quasi-religious, exclusive commitment to these ideas alone. Nazism with its messianic faith in ‘racial purity’ or Communism with its belief in the ‘historical destiny’ of the working class, were examples of what Popper called ‘historicism’; philosophies that claim to have uncovered ‘the “rhythms” or the “patterns”, the “laws” or the “trends” that underlie the evolution of history’. (Popper, The Poverty of Historicism) If an ideology claims to have uncovered the truth about the laws of historical development, if it knows there is a future utopia to be attained, there can be no place for those who get in the way of progress. Totalitarian regimes require the public to believe, and the state must be disciplined and ruthless with those ‘minorities’ who do not. Hitler’s idealist vision of a future national community (Volksgemeinschaft) could only be created at the expense of the minorities who could not belong, because as Ian Kershaw argues, ‘discriminatory feelings were built into [Hitler’s] idealism’.
The importance of the war
As in all countries, soldiers struggled to return to normalcy after the war; the economic crisis and high unemployment often denied them a purpose to life which the army had provided. Many were attracted to the paramilitary organisations and the violent camaraderie they provided. Hitler's brown shirted stormtroopers were an obvious attraction for many, as was their promise to undo the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty. When Hitler spoke about the need for a national revival, central to his plans were the foreign policy goals of regaining lost territories and reuniting German speaking peoples.
As in all countries, soldiers struggled to return to normalcy after the war; the economic crisis and high unemployment often denied them a purpose to life which the army had provided. Many were attracted to the paramilitary organisations and the violent camaraderie they provided. Hitler's brown shirted stormtroopers were an obvious attraction for many, as was their promise to undo the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty. When Hitler spoke about the need for a national revival, central to his plans were the foreign policy goals of regaining lost territories and reuniting German speaking peoples.
Human Agency
Structural factors can only provide a context into which historical actors are able to take decisions and make things happen. The structural factors which enabled Mussolini to March on Rome in 1922, did not guarantee that his actions would be successful. Indeed, even though the situation in post-war Italy and Germany was remarkably similar, the Communists, Freikorp and Nazis took it in turns to fail to bring down the Weimar state. Despite the favourable circumstances Hitler failed with his attempted Putsch in 1923.
Structural factors can only provide a context into which historical actors are able to take decisions and make things happen. The structural factors which enabled Mussolini to March on Rome in 1922, did not guarantee that his actions would be successful. Indeed, even though the situation in post-war Italy and Germany was remarkably similar, the Communists, Freikorp and Nazis took it in turns to fail to bring down the Weimar state. Despite the favourable circumstances Hitler failed with his attempted Putsch in 1923.
|
The trial and the aftermath did mark a turning point. Hitler's sham trial was turned into a propaganda triumph and the Nazi party itself was transformed into a national electoral force. Even though the Nazis won a limited percentage of the vote in the elections of 1924 and 1928, they still gained a small number of seats in the national (Federal) assembly. Under the guidance of Goebbels the Nazis developed a sophisticated propaganda campaign centred around the personality of Hitler and his brilliant oratory and with Roehm's SA they had a paramilitary organisation capable of defending their interests on the street. When the circumstances did change after the Wall Street Crash and the start of Great Depression (structural factors above), the Nazi Party was in a strong position to exploit it.
|
|
In 1928 German unemployment had been 2 million, by 1932 is was 6 million. The number of Nazi seats in the Reichstag rose from 12 in 1928 to 230 in July 1932 with 37% of the popular vote. The anti-Weimar, anti-democratic message of the Nazis began to tap into the discontent people felt with the negative impact of the socio-economic (structural) factors mentioned above.
|
The centrist, democratic parties appeared to have no answers to these problems and repeated weak coalition governments lacked parliamentary majorities necessary to pass effective legislation. In this context, the key historical agents were the German ruling elite who tried to break the political impasse by trying to exploit Hitler's popularity.
In January 1933, President Hindenburg was finally persuaded to appoint Hitler as Chancellor by former Chancellor Franz von Papen and financiers led by the Head of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht. It was a carefully calculated political move to counter the rise of Communists whose support had risen significantly between July and November 1932 and the fear that violent clashes between political extremists could escalate into full scale civil war. Von Papen argued that the Nazis would be controlled by offering Hitler only three cabinet places on January 30. 1933. Hitler accepted because the Nazi party was on verge of bankruptcy and and his position as party leader was under threat. When he was given the role of Chancellor the traditional German elites believed they had got themselves a temporary puppet to help weather the storm. In reality, the storm in the shape of the Reichstag fire was only just about to break. |
|
|
Activity
The activity for this lesson will be a class based lecture. Make sure to put your notes - supplemented from here if necessary - in your OneNote.
The activity for this lesson will be a class based lecture. Make sure to put your notes - supplemented from here if necessary - in your OneNote.
Extension (essential for IB students.)
After Lenin and Mussolini this your third case study on the rise of an authoritarian state. As IB students you always need to be looking out for similarities and differences between the the examples you study. The approach of structure and agency I have used here is developed in more detail on these IB pages. I have also made three films to explain the key concepts (below).
After Lenin and Mussolini this your third case study on the rise of an authoritarian state. As IB students you always need to be looking out for similarities and differences between the the examples you study. The approach of structure and agency I have used here is developed in more detail on these IB pages. I have also made three films to explain the key concepts (below).
|
Structural factors - PESC
|
Structural factors - War
|
The role of agency.
|