A short history of propaganda
Propaganda has a much longer and more complex history than is often assumed, and its origins lie not in the twentieth century but in early modern Europe. The term itself comes from the Catholic Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, established in 1622 during the Counter-Reformation. Its purpose was to propagate the faith by coordinating missionary activity, education, and communication in response to the spread of Protestantism. Crucially, propaganda was not initially associated with lies or manipulation, but with the organised dissemination of beliefs. The Society of Jesus (Jesuits) played a central role in this early propaganda effort. They understood that persuasion required more than doctrine alone. Education, symbolism, ritual, visual culture, and emotional engagement were essential to shaping belief and loyalty. This marked an early recognition that ideas spread most effectively when they are embedded in culture and identity rather than imposed by force.
Over time, the meaning of propaganda expanded beyond religion. By the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, emerging states began to use similar techniques for political purposes. During the Napoleonic era, rulers such as Napoleon Bonaparte used newspapers, bulletins, art, monuments, and public ceremonies to shape public opinion and promote national loyalty. This pre-industrial propaganda supported early nation building by creating shared myths, heroes, and identities. By the eve of industrialisation, propaganda had evolved from a religious tool into a central instrument of political power, ready to be transformed further by mass media and modern psychology.
Over time, the meaning of propaganda expanded beyond religion. By the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, emerging states began to use similar techniques for political purposes. During the Napoleonic era, rulers such as Napoleon Bonaparte used newspapers, bulletins, art, monuments, and public ceremonies to shape public opinion and promote national loyalty. This pre-industrial propaganda supported early nation building by creating shared myths, heroes, and identities. By the eve of industrialisation, propaganda had evolved from a religious tool into a central instrument of political power, ready to be transformed further by mass media and modern psychology.
On modern propaganda we need to make two important observations. The first is that all states use propaganda, even if they do not call it propaganda. The second is that there are different levels and forms of propaganda, from the truthful, socially useful government information, all the way to what Hitler called ‘the big lie’, with many stages in between.
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Hitler on the Big Lie
All this was inspired by the principle - which is quite true in itself - that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily; and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths, and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Mein Kampf p.134 |
(a) Propaganda as government information
Public information publications and broadcasts are an essential and legitimate form of propaganda in all states and they can be very useful at dealing with significant social issues. Policy must be explained and the complex issues have to be simplified. In this respect, campaigns against alcoholism in the USSR in the 1980s were no different than campaigns to change sexual behaviour in the AIDS awareness campaigns in the USA at the same time. Both were forms of propaganda that sought to change individual behaviour of those who enjoyed unrestricted alcohol or sex by changing the way people thought about these activities. Public information campaigns against smoking have been some of the most effective forms of propaganda campaigns in the 20th century and the fact that these national campaigns began first in Germany as part of the Nazi Party’s promotion of a healthy Aryan lifestyle in the 1930s does not make it any different to campaigns followed later by democratic regimes.
'He does not devour it… it devours him.'
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Public information campaigns against smoking have been some of the most effective forms of propaganda campaigns in the 20th century and the fact that these national campaigns began first in Germany as part of the Nazi Party’s promotion of a healthy Aryan lifestyle in the 1930s does not make it any different to campaigns followed later by democratic regimes.
Left: Nazi government campaign against smoking from 1941. Public information publications and broadcasts are an essential and legitimate form of propaganda in all states and they can be very useful at dealing with significant social issues. Policy must be explained and the complex issues have to be simplified. In this respect, campaigns against alcoholism in the USSR in the 1980s were no different than campaigns to change sexual behaviour in the AIDS awareness campaigns in the USA at the same time. Both were forms of propaganda that sought to change individual behaviour of those who enjoyed unrestricted alcohol or sex by changing the way people thought about these activities. |
Public information campaigns against smoking have been some of the most effective forms of propaganda campaigns in the 20th century and the fact that these national campaigns began first in Germany as part of the Nazi Party’s promotion of a healthy Aryan lifestyle in the 1930s does not make it any different to campaigns followed later by democratic regimes.
(b) Propaganda for Nation Building
The most important role of propaganda in both democratic and authoritarian regimes has been the creation and reinforcement of patriotism; a sense of collective identity and mutual dependency, what sociologists describe as social solidarity. In the 19th century with an increasing number of citizens living in towns and cities rather than real village communities, the state needed to create what historian Benedict Anderson famously described as an ‘imagined community’. An imagined community is different from an actual community because it is not based on everyday face-to-face interaction between its members. The state is more effectively run if people feel a sense of duty to it, a sense of belonging and shared community that means they are willing to recognise the interests of others, sacrificing their own self-interests for the higher good of the state. When in the late 19th century, rising literacy levels and the new mass media of national popular press combined with an extending franchise that was giving increasing numbers a say in how the country was being run, it became possible and increasingly important to influence what the masses were thinking.
The most important role of propaganda in both democratic and authoritarian regimes has been the creation and reinforcement of patriotism; a sense of collective identity and mutual dependency, what sociologists describe as social solidarity. In the 19th century with an increasing number of citizens living in towns and cities rather than real village communities, the state needed to create what historian Benedict Anderson famously described as an ‘imagined community’. An imagined community is different from an actual community because it is not based on everyday face-to-face interaction between its members. The state is more effectively run if people feel a sense of duty to it, a sense of belonging and shared community that means they are willing to recognise the interests of others, sacrificing their own self-interests for the higher good of the state. When in the late 19th century, rising literacy levels and the new mass media of national popular press combined with an extending franchise that was giving increasing numbers a say in how the country was being run, it became possible and increasingly important to influence what the masses were thinking.
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Marshall McLuhan - Medium is the message
‘The medium is the message’ is a phrase coined by Marshall McLuhan in the 1960s that emphasises how the form of the medium (newsprint, television, radio) influences the way the information is perceived. When the production (printing, broadcasting etc.) media requires significant investment or resources beyond the means of the ordinary citizen whether individual or in a group - radio in the 1930s, printing before the 1970s, broadcast media before satellite 1980s - then it is easier for the state to control. The inability of the state to control new forms/changing forms of media can help to undermine a state. Mass production of cheap shortwave transistor radios, satellite television, VHS cassettes and most notably the Internet (Facebook revolution 2011) have all provided challenges to authoritarian states. |
The precedents of many of the authoritarian techniques of 20th century authoritarianism were developed in the 19th century. National flags and symbols, commemoration and anthems became the essential theatrical props of the modern nation state. Through what the historian Eric Hobsbawm famously described as ‘invented traditions’, the modern nation state sought popular legitimacy by denying its modernity and claiming continuity with a pre-industrial past.
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Throughout Europe the newly modernising states established rituals and ceremonies of national celebration that were deliberately made to look as old and as natural as possible. The gothic or classical style chosen for new national parliaments or museums, the selection and standardization of popular ‘folk’ songs and costume or the popularisation of national festivals and rituals (e.g. the Victorian Christmas), all contributed to the creation of a popular national consciousness that was distinctive from and (often) considered superior to that of the neighbouring nations. The function of such propaganda was meant to create social solidarity, popular respect for authority and the inculcation of the ruling ideas of the state.
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Eric Hobsbawm’s - Three types of invented traditions a) Those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities. b) Those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority. c) Those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour. ‘Introduction: Inventing traditions’, in Hobsbawm and Ranger, (eds) The Invention of Tradition 1983 p.9 |
Democracy when it emerged in the late 19th century had only done so after a century or more of opposition by ruling elites to the extension of the franchise to the lower orders. The fear of democracy, which for the elite was closely associated with the mob rule and terror of Robespierre's post-revolutionary leadership of France, was summed up in the concept of what Alexis de Tocqueville called the 'tyranny of the majority'. The first mass circulation newspapers which encouraged the sort of nation building popular culture prior to the First World War, were remarkably successful at channelling popular enthusiasm away from socialism, trade unionism and the suffragist movement (by definition in the interests of the majority) which had threatened to undermine popular nationalist support for war before 1914.
(c) World War One
The celebratory mood that accompanied the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 demonstrated clearly how effective such nationalist propaganda had been. But it was the First World War itself that marked the real beginning of what historian David Welch calls the ‘propaganda century’.
The celebratory mood that accompanied the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 demonstrated clearly how effective such nationalist propaganda had been. But it was the First World War itself that marked the real beginning of what historian David Welch calls the ‘propaganda century’.
'By now, media such as daily newspapers and weekly magazines, and the novelty of film, had created something-new: a mass audience. The means thus existed for governments to mobilise entire industrial societies for warfare, and to disseminate information (or propaganda) to large groups of people within relatively short time spans. Once it was realised that the war was going to be an all-embracing and long drawn out struggle—not apparent in the first months of 1914—the governments and militaries of the belligerent countries saw the necessity of a sustained propaganda campaign to bolster the Home and Fighting fronts, as well as to try and sap the enemy's will and garner support from non-belligerent nations—for Britain, primarily the United States. Accordingly, the press, leaflets, posters and the new medium of film were exploited, censored and coordinated (arguably for the first time) in order to propagate officially approved themes.' David Welch - Propaganda
The First World War took the relatively subtle peacetime means of cultural nation building and gradually replaced it with a systematic mechanism of censorship and propaganda. During the First World War, British propaganda posters emerged from a growing partnership between the state and commercial culture. Early efforts were improvised, using advertising artists who adapted familiar peacetime techniques such as bold imagery, simple slogans, and emotional appeal.
In fighting a first ‘total war’, governments took unprecedented control over all areas of national life and control of information was central to this. Posters increasingly targeted fear, guilt, duty, and identity rather than rational argument, using carefully constructed images of heroism, vulnerability, and threat. These campaigns drew on emerging psychological research, recognising that repetition, simplicity, and visual symbolism were more effective than debate. Constant public exposure marked a shift toward persuasion through emotional saturation rather than reasoned discussion. (see posters below)
The modern propaganda industry was born in the USA in 1916 when Woodrow Wilson's government manufactured a u-turn in American public opinion in support of US involvement in the war. In a matter of six months the newly established Committee on Public Information, the Creel Commission, turned a 'pacifist population' into a hysterical, war-mongering population which wanted to destroy everything German, tear the Germans limb from limb, go to war and save the world.' (Noam Chomsky,Media Control, page 7). It was the US Creel Committee that developed some of the most powerful and technologically sophisticated propaganda ever seen. (see film below.)
In fighting a first ‘total war’, governments took unprecedented control over all areas of national life and control of information was central to this. Posters increasingly targeted fear, guilt, duty, and identity rather than rational argument, using carefully constructed images of heroism, vulnerability, and threat. These campaigns drew on emerging psychological research, recognising that repetition, simplicity, and visual symbolism were more effective than debate. Constant public exposure marked a shift toward persuasion through emotional saturation rather than reasoned discussion. (see posters below)
The modern propaganda industry was born in the USA in 1916 when Woodrow Wilson's government manufactured a u-turn in American public opinion in support of US involvement in the war. In a matter of six months the newly established Committee on Public Information, the Creel Commission, turned a 'pacifist population' into a hysterical, war-mongering population which wanted to destroy everything German, tear the Germans limb from limb, go to war and save the world.' (Noam Chomsky,Media Control, page 7). It was the US Creel Committee that developed some of the most powerful and technologically sophisticated propaganda ever seen. (see film below.)
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Even Britain, the most liberal European state, established a propaganda agency in 1917 (The National War Aims Committee) to manage the media campaign and to innovate and develop new propaganda techniques. The aim of World War One propaganda and censorship had two aspects, both sides of which would characterise later authoritarian campaigns. The governments were not merely concerned with maintaining public morale in the fight against a foreign enemy; they were also concerned about the threat of revolution from within. In the end it was revolution and the inability of the German state to maintain morale that cost them the war or as Ludendorff preferred to put it ‘stabbed the German army in the back’. This would be a lesson learnt by all the authoritarian states that were born out of the First World War.
(d) The interwar years and the birth of 'public relations'.
After the First World War, propaganda did not disappear with the return of peace. Instead, it was rebranded, professionalised, and normalised within democratic societies. The central figure in this transformation was Edward Bernays, an American public relations theorist and the nephew of Sigmund Freud. Bernays had worked for the U.S. government’s wartime propaganda body, the Committee on Public Information, and drew a crucial lesson from the war: mass opinion could be shaped rapidly and predictably if psychological insights were applied correctly.
In the 1920s, Bernays argued that propaganda was not only unavoidable but necessary in modern mass democracies. In his book Propaganda (1928), he claimed that society was governed by an “invisible government” of those who understood how to manipulate public opinion. Rather than appealing to reason, Bernays used ideas drawn from Freud about unconscious desire, fear, and identity. His techniques linked products, policies, and political ideas to emotions such as freedom, masculinity, femininity, or social status. What mattered was not truth, but association.
Crucially, these methods were soon adopted by the state as well as by corporations. Whilst totalitarian states in Germany and Russia developed sophisticated - albeit coercive - propaganda that was aligned with a regime of strict censorship, democratic governments recognised that consent could be manufactured more effectively through persuasion than coercion. This marked a decisive shift from overt wartime propaganda to peacetime public relations, a term Bernays deliberately promoted to avoid the negative connotations of propaganda after 1918.
After the First World War, propaganda did not disappear with the return of peace. Instead, it was rebranded, professionalised, and normalised within democratic societies. The central figure in this transformation was Edward Bernays, an American public relations theorist and the nephew of Sigmund Freud. Bernays had worked for the U.S. government’s wartime propaganda body, the Committee on Public Information, and drew a crucial lesson from the war: mass opinion could be shaped rapidly and predictably if psychological insights were applied correctly.
In the 1920s, Bernays argued that propaganda was not only unavoidable but necessary in modern mass democracies. In his book Propaganda (1928), he claimed that society was governed by an “invisible government” of those who understood how to manipulate public opinion. Rather than appealing to reason, Bernays used ideas drawn from Freud about unconscious desire, fear, and identity. His techniques linked products, policies, and political ideas to emotions such as freedom, masculinity, femininity, or social status. What mattered was not truth, but association.
Crucially, these methods were soon adopted by the state as well as by corporations. Whilst totalitarian states in Germany and Russia developed sophisticated - albeit coercive - propaganda that was aligned with a regime of strict censorship, democratic governments recognised that consent could be manufactured more effectively through persuasion than coercion. This marked a decisive shift from overt wartime propaganda to peacetime public relations, a term Bernays deliberately promoted to avoid the negative connotations of propaganda after 1918.
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This transformation is explored in The Century of the Self by Adam Curtis, particularly in the first episode, Happiness Machines. Curtis argues that twentieth-century politics increasingly shifted away from informing citizens and toward managing their emotions. Focusing on Edward Bernays, the episode shows how ideas drawn from Freud were used to bypass rational debate and instead appeal to unconscious desires, fears, and identities. Techniques developed for wartime propaganda were redirected into consumer culture and democratic politics, encouraging people to see themselves less as citizens with collective responsibilities and more as individuals driven by personal wants. As a result, persuasion in modern societies operates subtly, continuously, and often invisibly, shaping behaviour without overt coercion.
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