Lesson 1 - The short-term causes of the Cold War 1945-47
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Background - The Development of the Cold War before 1945
The Cold War grew out of deep-rooted tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, especially the United States and Britain. Although it emerged fully after 1945, the seeds of conflict had existed since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. When Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized power, they established the first socialist state based on communist principles. To the capitalist democracies, this was a direct ideological threat. Lenin created the Comintern in 1919 to encourage revolution abroad, which convinced the West that communism aimed to destroy their political and economic systems. Western intervention in the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1921 confirmed Soviet fears that the capitalist powers would use force to destroy communism whenever possible. |
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Relations remained hostile throughout the inter-war years. The Soviet Union’s refusal to repay pre-revolutionary debts and its nationalisation of foreign property angered Western governments and investors, especially in France and Britain. The British monarchy also disliked the Soviet regime because the Bolsheviks had executed Tsar Nicholas II, a cousin of King George V. These tensions prevented meaningful cooperation when Hitler’s Germany became a common threat in the 1930s. Britain and France pursued appeasement, hoping to avoid another war, but Stalin saw this as weakness and as evidence that they wanted Germany to destroy the Soviet Union. In 1939 Stalin responded by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact, (see David Low's cartoon right) which divided Poland between Germany and the USSR and gave the Soviet Union time to prepare for an eventual German attack. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the USSR joined Britain and later the USA in the Grand Alliance against the Axis powers. Yet mistrust persisted. Stalin believed that Britain and the USA delayed opening a Second Front in Western Europe to weaken the Soviet Union.
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Disagreements about the future of Poland also caused major tension. Poland was vital to Soviet security because it had been the invasion route into Russia three times in the twentieth century. Stalin wanted a friendly, communist-dominated government there, while Britain had gone to war in 1939 to defend Polish independence and supported the London-based government in exile. The conflict over Poland worsened in 1943 when German troops discovered mass graves in the Katyn Forest containing the bodies of over 10,000 Polish officers captured by Soviet troops in 1939. The Soviets blamed the Germans, but most Poles and Western governments believed the USSR was responsible. A year later, the Warsaw Rising of August 1944 made things worse. The Polish resistance rose against the German occupiers, hoping to liberate the city before the Red Army arrived. The Soviet forces, however, stopped their advance and refused to assist, allowing the Germans to crush the uprising brutally. Stalin claimed military reasons, but the West saw this as deliberate. When the Red Army finally took Warsaw in January 1945, Poland was left devastated and politically dependent on the USSR.
Activity 1
Make a short set of summary notes on the Cold War before 1945 under three headings: earliest origins, 1930s and World War II. For more see this article from Steve Phillips Cold War which also serves as a useful revision of the history of the USSR and international relations in the interwar years.
Make a short set of summary notes on the Cold War before 1945 under three headings: earliest origins, 1930s and World War II. For more see this article from Steve Phillips Cold War which also serves as a useful revision of the history of the USSR and international relations in the interwar years.
Yalta and Potsdam
By the beginning of 1945, the Second World War in Europe was nearing its end. The Allied powers – the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union – had fought together to defeat Nazi Germany, but their unity was fragile. The Grand Alliance had been formed out of necessity, not genuine trust. Behind the public show of cooperation, deep ideological differences and conflicting national interests were already shaping the post-war world.
The most serious point of tension was the future of Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Stalin wanted to secure the Soviet Union’s western border and ensure that neighbouring countries were friendly, or at least controlled by communist governments loyal to Moscow. Britain and the USA, on the other hand, argued that these nations should be allowed to choose their own governments through free elections. This clash between Soviet security and Western democracy lay at the heart of post-war disagreements. The discovery of the Katyn Massacre and the Soviet refusal to support the Polish resistance during the Warsaw Rising made it clear to Churchill and Roosevelt that Stalin intended to dominate Poland. At the same time, Stalin suspected that the delayed opening of the Second Front in Western Europe had been designed to weaken the USSR by leaving it to bear the full weight of the fighting against Germany.
As the Red Army advanced across Eastern Europe in 1944 and 1945, it established control over large areas that the Soviets had liberated from German occupation. This gave Stalin enormous leverage in any post-war negotiations. Western leaders feared that he would not withdraw his forces and that these countries would become part of a Soviet sphere of influence.
When the Big Three met at Yalta in February 1945, they did so in an atmosphere of victory mixed with distrust. They agreed on several broad principles – the defeat and occupation of Germany, the creation of the United Nations, and free elections in liberated Europe – but each side interpreted these promises differently. By the time they met again at Potsdam in July 1945, the situation had changed dramatically. Germany had surrendered, Roosevelt was dead and replaced by Truman, and the USA had tested an atomic bomb. The shared purpose that had united the Allies during the war was gone, and the disagreements that had been concealed at Yalta now surfaced openly. The wartime alliance was beginning to collapse, setting the stage for the Cold War.
By the beginning of 1945, the Second World War in Europe was nearing its end. The Allied powers – the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union – had fought together to defeat Nazi Germany, but their unity was fragile. The Grand Alliance had been formed out of necessity, not genuine trust. Behind the public show of cooperation, deep ideological differences and conflicting national interests were already shaping the post-war world.
The most serious point of tension was the future of Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Stalin wanted to secure the Soviet Union’s western border and ensure that neighbouring countries were friendly, or at least controlled by communist governments loyal to Moscow. Britain and the USA, on the other hand, argued that these nations should be allowed to choose their own governments through free elections. This clash between Soviet security and Western democracy lay at the heart of post-war disagreements. The discovery of the Katyn Massacre and the Soviet refusal to support the Polish resistance during the Warsaw Rising made it clear to Churchill and Roosevelt that Stalin intended to dominate Poland. At the same time, Stalin suspected that the delayed opening of the Second Front in Western Europe had been designed to weaken the USSR by leaving it to bear the full weight of the fighting against Germany.
As the Red Army advanced across Eastern Europe in 1944 and 1945, it established control over large areas that the Soviets had liberated from German occupation. This gave Stalin enormous leverage in any post-war negotiations. Western leaders feared that he would not withdraw his forces and that these countries would become part of a Soviet sphere of influence.
When the Big Three met at Yalta in February 1945, they did so in an atmosphere of victory mixed with distrust. They agreed on several broad principles – the defeat and occupation of Germany, the creation of the United Nations, and free elections in liberated Europe – but each side interpreted these promises differently. By the time they met again at Potsdam in July 1945, the situation had changed dramatically. Germany had surrendered, Roosevelt was dead and replaced by Truman, and the USA had tested an atomic bomb. The shared purpose that had united the Allies during the war was gone, and the disagreements that had been concealed at Yalta now surfaced openly. The wartime alliance was beginning to collapse, setting the stage for the Cold War.
Although Yalta and Potsdam shaped the immediate post-war order, they left many crucial questions unresolved, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The Declaration on Liberated Europe, agreed at Yalta, promised free elections and democratic governments in the countries liberated from Nazi rule. In practice, however, Stalin interpreted this as permission to install pro-Soviet regimes that would guarantee Soviet security. The Red Army already occupied much of the region, and Western powers lacked the means to enforce their vision of political freedom. This created the conditions for the gradual Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, beginning in Poland, Hungary and Romania, and the emergence of a divided continent.
The future of Germany was another source of uncertainty. The Allies agreed to divide it into occupation zones and to demilitarise and denazify the country, but they never reached agreement on how it should be governed or economically managed in the long term. The Soviets wanted reparations and a weak Germany to ensure security; the Western Allies feared that excessive punishment would cripple recovery and make Europe vulnerable to communist influence. As the USSR stripped resources from its zone, the Western powers began to see the economic revival of their own zones as essential for stability and resistance to communism.
In Western Europe, devastation from the war created fertile ground for social unrest and radical politics. With millions displaced and economies in ruins, communist parties gained popularity in countries like France and Italy. For the United States, this raised fears that economic hardship would lead to political extremism and Soviet expansion. American leaders began to see European recovery as inseparable from the global fight against communism.
Thus, by the end of 1945, the framework for post-war peace was already undermined by conflicting ambitions. The promises of Yalta and Potsdam were built on fragile compromises, and the unresolved questions of Eastern Europe, Germany’s future, and Western Europe’s recovery would soon become the first battlefields of the Cold War.
The future of Germany was another source of uncertainty. The Allies agreed to divide it into occupation zones and to demilitarise and denazify the country, but they never reached agreement on how it should be governed or economically managed in the long term. The Soviets wanted reparations and a weak Germany to ensure security; the Western Allies feared that excessive punishment would cripple recovery and make Europe vulnerable to communist influence. As the USSR stripped resources from its zone, the Western powers began to see the economic revival of their own zones as essential for stability and resistance to communism.
In Western Europe, devastation from the war created fertile ground for social unrest and radical politics. With millions displaced and economies in ruins, communist parties gained popularity in countries like France and Italy. For the United States, this raised fears that economic hardship would lead to political extremism and Soviet expansion. American leaders began to see European recovery as inseparable from the global fight against communism.
Thus, by the end of 1945, the framework for post-war peace was already undermined by conflicting ambitions. The promises of Yalta and Potsdam were built on fragile compromises, and the unresolved questions of Eastern Europe, Germany’s future, and Western Europe’s recovery would soon become the first battlefields of the Cold War.
Activity 2
Read the text above and watch the short video extracts on Yalta and Potsdam. Complete the 'focus task' on page 323 of your textbook, 'Why did the Allies begin to fall out in 1945?'
Read the text above and watch the short video extracts on Yalta and Potsdam. Complete the 'focus task' on page 323 of your textbook, 'Why did the Allies begin to fall out in 1945?'
The three sources of tension which caused the Cold War: Eastern Europe, Germany and European Reconstruction.
1. Eastern Europe
The Declaration on Liberated Europe, agreed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, had supposedly guaranteed democratic elections for all states liberated from Nazi control. In reality, however, in the areas occupied by the Red Army, Stalin had no intention of relinquishing control over territories he regarded as an essential buffer for the defence of the Soviet Union. Three times since 1914 Russia had been invaded through Poland, and Stalin was determined that this would never happen again. Across Central and Eastern Europe, pro-Soviet regimes were imposed, and where elections were held, they were carefully managed to ensure Communist victories.
n the early stages, coalition governments were formed, often including both communists and non-communists. However, the communists gradually took over key ministries such as the police, defence, and interior, allowing them to control the security forces and intimidate opponents. Step by step, opposition parties were weakened, their leaders arrested or forced into exile, and eventually outlawed altogether. This gradual method of gaining total control became known as “salami tactics”, a term used by Hungarian communist leader Mátyás Rákosi to describe how the opposition was eliminated “slice by slice.” (see map below)
By early 1946, Western observers were becoming alarmed at the speed of Soviet expansion. In February that year, George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from the American Embassy in Moscow warned that Soviet power was inherently expansionist and that the USSR would only respond to firm resistance. His analysis confirmed what many Western leaders already feared: that Stalin’s actions were not defensive but part of a broader attempt to extend Soviet influence across Europe. By the end of 1946, an “iron curtain” had descended across the continent, dividing East from West.
n the early stages, coalition governments were formed, often including both communists and non-communists. However, the communists gradually took over key ministries such as the police, defence, and interior, allowing them to control the security forces and intimidate opponents. Step by step, opposition parties were weakened, their leaders arrested or forced into exile, and eventually outlawed altogether. This gradual method of gaining total control became known as “salami tactics”, a term used by Hungarian communist leader Mátyás Rákosi to describe how the opposition was eliminated “slice by slice.” (see map below)
By early 1946, Western observers were becoming alarmed at the speed of Soviet expansion. In February that year, George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from the American Embassy in Moscow warned that Soviet power was inherently expansionist and that the USSR would only respond to firm resistance. His analysis confirmed what many Western leaders already feared: that Stalin’s actions were not defensive but part of a broader attempt to extend Soviet influence across Europe. By the end of 1946, an “iron curtain” had descended across the continent, dividing East from West.
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Western leaders now feared that communism would spread further into the economically devastated areas of Western and Southern Europe. The immediate crisis came in Greece and Turkey. In Greece, a bitter civil war was being fought between the royalist government, supported by Britain, and communist guerrillas. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was pressuring Turkey for control of the Dardanelles Strait, a key access point to the Mediterranean. Britain, exhausted and nearly bankrupt after six years of war, announced in February 1947 that it could no longer provide financial or military aid to either country.
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Britain's inability to sustain support for anti-communist regimes in Greece and Turkey led President Truman to break with the established US policy of isolationism. In March 1947 he announced what became known as the Truman Doctrine, 'I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.'
This signalled American determination to resist further Soviet expansion and to do so by the deployment of countervailing power, by what was called the policy of containment.
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2. Germany
At the end of the Second World War, the Allies faced a difficult question: what to do with Germany. Churchill and Roosevelt had met in Quebec in September 1944 and agreed a policy on the future of Germany. Named after Henry Morgenthau, United States Secretary of the Treasury, the Morgenthau plan was designed to deindustrialise Germany and to break her up into separate states. Supported by France and the USSR, this policy was intended to prevent Germany from ever being able to wage war again. In the words of Roosevelt 'I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war'. At Potsdam (1945), the Allies agreed on demilitarisation and reparations, but cooperation soon broke down as the Soviets stripped their zone while the Western zones faced economic collapse.
The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 changed the tone of Allied relations. His successor, Harry Truman, was far more suspicious of Stalin and less willing to compromise. As Soviet control tightened over Eastern Europe, American policy shifted from punishment to reconstruction. A ruined Germany was now seen as a danger, not a safeguard, because economic chaos could fuel communist influence. Such was the complete and absolute devastation of Germany, the Allies needed to take over the running of the country, with each of the four powers responsible for one sector each. Divisions between the former allies about how the sectors such be administered were apparent from the start. As you will have seen in the film above, the USSR plundered its eastern sector for reparations, whereas the western powers became concerned that a hungry and desperate German population might turn once again to political extremism.
Before the war, the English cartoonist David Low was a strident critic of the allied policy of appeasement. After the war he was a strident critic of the post-war occupation. The following cartoons were all published in 1945-46.
Before the war, the English cartoonist David Low was a strident critic of the allied policy of appeasement. After the war he was a strident critic of the post-war occupation. The following cartoons were all published in 1945-46.
Oral practice - optional
Select one of the six David Low cartoons above and paste it into your notes. Referring to details in the cartoon, explain the message that Low is trying to convey.
By 1946–47, US Secretary of State James Byrnes called for rebuilding Germany as a self-supporting state, and in 1947 General George Marshall proposed massive American aid for European recovery. The Marshall Plan marked the turning point: instead of weakening Germany, the West sought to rebuild it as the economic heart of a free Europe. Stalin’s refusal to participate deepened the division of the continent.Tensions reached breaking point in 1948, when the Western powers introduced a new currency, the Deutsche Mark, in their zones to stabilise the economy. Stalin saw this as a threat to Soviet control and responded by imposing the Berlin Blockade (Lesson 2)
3. European Reconstruction
The third important postwar dispute within the grand alliance concerned European reconstruction. The Truman Doctrine had established a set of political policies, but if communism was to be 'contained', western European capitalism needed to be strengthened. As American General Lucius Clay stated, 'There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on a thousand'. The communist parties of France, Italy and other countries had established a strong position for themselves after the war.
Why were the communist parties so popular in 1945?
First, communists had led resistance movements against Nazi occupation in France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece. Their courage and sacrifice gave them moral authority at a time when traditional politicians were discredited by collaboration or failure. Second, post-war Europe was ruined: unemployment, hunger and homelessness were widespread. Communist parties promised equality, social reform and state control of key industries, which appealed to workers and peasants who had lost faith in capitalism. Finally, many Europeans compared their memories of the Great Depression with the apparent success of the Soviet Five-Year Plans, which seemed to have brought full employment and rapid industrial growth. To many, communism looked efficient and fair.
Until May 1947 the French and Italian communist parties were members of ruling coalitions, and communists participated in the government of other West European states as well. The American solution was the Marshall Plan. US Secretary of State, George Marshall's plan for a European Recovery Program, was made public in a famous Commencement Address at Harvard University on June 5th 1947.
Why were the communist parties so popular in 1945?
First, communists had led resistance movements against Nazi occupation in France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece. Their courage and sacrifice gave them moral authority at a time when traditional politicians were discredited by collaboration or failure. Second, post-war Europe was ruined: unemployment, hunger and homelessness were widespread. Communist parties promised equality, social reform and state control of key industries, which appealed to workers and peasants who had lost faith in capitalism. Finally, many Europeans compared their memories of the Great Depression with the apparent success of the Soviet Five-Year Plans, which seemed to have brought full employment and rapid industrial growth. To many, communism looked efficient and fair.
Until May 1947 the French and Italian communist parties were members of ruling coalitions, and communists participated in the government of other West European states as well. The American solution was the Marshall Plan. US Secretary of State, George Marshall's plan for a European Recovery Program, was made public in a famous Commencement Address at Harvard University on June 5th 1947.
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In sponsoring a European economic recovery which would contribute to political stability, Marshall aimed to undermine support for the communist left and to strengthen the political position of anti-communist parties and movements. By the time Marshall Aid came to an end, in 1952, the United States had spent some $13 billion, more than all previous US overseas aid combined. Unlike previous support during the war, Marshall Aid was not loans to be paid back but a grant, a gift for European countries to spend as they wished. If a Marshall Plan was attempted today it would cost over $200b. But it wasn't just financial support. As the USSR had interfered in the 'elections' on central and eastern Europe, so now also did the Americans through the anti-communist, covert action of the CIA. (see film left)
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Initially, the USSR and central and eastern European countries applied for Marshall Aid. But at the Paris conference in July 1947 which was established to coordinate the funding, serious divisions emerged. The British and French insisted that decisions must be made by all European countries - east and west - together. The USSR considered this an unacceptable attempt by the western allies to interfere in the internal affairs of the communist regimes. The USSR withdrew from the talks and forced its satellite states in eastern Europe to do the same. This would have significant implications for Yugoslavia who refused to withdraw and for Czechoslovakia which had a genuine democratically elected communist government in coalition with non-communist parties. Tito's Yugoslavia was expelled from the Eastern Bloc and the communists seized absolute power in Czechoslovakia. These events persuaded the US Congress to release the funds for Marshall Aid.
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The Soviet response to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan came in September 1947. The USSR established the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), as a successor to the Comintern. In an important speech A.A. Zhdanov spoke of how the world had become divided into ‘two camps’ and how the USSR must defend itself from western imperialism. Comecon, the Soviet equivalent to Marshall Aid was made available for Eastern Bloc allies. |
Activity 3
Using the films and text above to help you, produce the text of a seven minute oral that addresses the question 'why did the Cold War begin between 1945 and 1947. Your three headings are:
a. Eastern Europe
b. Germany
c. European Reconstruction
In Eastern Europe, think about how the promises made in the Declaration on Liberated Europe at Yalta were interpreted differently by the Western Allies and Stalin. Why did the USSR regard this region as vital to its security, and how did repeated invasions through Poland shape Soviet policy? Consider how salami tactics helped communist parties gain control across Poland, Hungary and Romania, and how the Long Telegram and Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech reflected growing Western alarm at Soviet expansion.
In Germany, reflect on how Allied aims shifted from punishing to rebuilding. The Morgenthau Plan had sought to keep Germany weak, but under Truman’s tougher stance after Roosevelt’s death, the West came to see recovery as essential for stability. The Marshall Plan embodied this new approach, while Stalin’s refusal to participate deepened divisions. These tensions reached crisis point with the Berlin Blockade of 1948, when Germany’s fate became central to the Cold War.
For European Reconstruction, ask why communist parties gained such support in France, Italy and elsewhere. How did post-war hardship, memories of the Great Depression, and the apparent success of Soviet Five-Year Plans make communism attractive? Explore how the Truman Doctrine marked America’s shift from isolationism to containment, and how the Marshall Plan sought to rebuild Western Europe and curb communism. The Soviet reply, through Cominform and Comecon, confirmed that Europe was now divided into two opposing blocs.
Using the films and text above to help you, produce the text of a seven minute oral that addresses the question 'why did the Cold War begin between 1945 and 1947. Your three headings are:
a. Eastern Europe
b. Germany
c. European Reconstruction
In Eastern Europe, think about how the promises made in the Declaration on Liberated Europe at Yalta were interpreted differently by the Western Allies and Stalin. Why did the USSR regard this region as vital to its security, and how did repeated invasions through Poland shape Soviet policy? Consider how salami tactics helped communist parties gain control across Poland, Hungary and Romania, and how the Long Telegram and Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech reflected growing Western alarm at Soviet expansion.
In Germany, reflect on how Allied aims shifted from punishing to rebuilding. The Morgenthau Plan had sought to keep Germany weak, but under Truman’s tougher stance after Roosevelt’s death, the West came to see recovery as essential for stability. The Marshall Plan embodied this new approach, while Stalin’s refusal to participate deepened divisions. These tensions reached crisis point with the Berlin Blockade of 1948, when Germany’s fate became central to the Cold War.
For European Reconstruction, ask why communist parties gained such support in France, Italy and elsewhere. How did post-war hardship, memories of the Great Depression, and the apparent success of Soviet Five-Year Plans make communism attractive? Explore how the Truman Doctrine marked America’s shift from isolationism to containment, and how the Marshall Plan sought to rebuild Western Europe and curb communism. The Soviet reply, through Cominform and Comecon, confirmed that Europe was now divided into two opposing blocs.
Extras
The content of this section is based on this article by Geoffrey Roberts on the three important post-war disputes.
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