Lesson 1 - Introduction - Industry, Empire and Nation: Europe before World War I
In the previous units, you studied three major developments of the nineteenth century: the Industrial Revolution, the rise of nationalism, and the expansion of imperialism. Together, these transformed Europe and the wider world. By 1900, they had created a new international system in which power was measured by industrial strength, military capacity, national unity and empire.
Industrialisation made countries wealthier and more powerful, but it also increased competition. Industrial states needed raw materials, markets and secure trade routes, which encouraged imperial expansion. At the same time, nationalism reshaped Europe by creating new states, such as Germany and Italy, and by weakening multi-national empires like Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. National pride, fear and rivalry increasingly shaped foreign policy. These developments did not make war inevitable, but they raised the risks. Industrial power allowed states to build large armies and modern weapons. Imperialism brought countries into conflict overseas. Nationalism encouraged suspicion of rivals and support for aggressive policies. By the early twentieth century, Europe was dominated by six Great Powers, all of whom feared falling behind the others. This lesson introduces those six powers and explains how they were drawn into two opposing alliance systems. These alliances were meant to preserve peace, but in practice they increased tension and made Europe more unstable. Understanding the strengths, weaknesses and fears of each Great Power is essential for explaining why, in 1914, a crisis in the Balkans escalated into a global war
Industrialisation made countries wealthier and more powerful, but it also increased competition. Industrial states needed raw materials, markets and secure trade routes, which encouraged imperial expansion. At the same time, nationalism reshaped Europe by creating new states, such as Germany and Italy, and by weakening multi-national empires like Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. National pride, fear and rivalry increasingly shaped foreign policy. These developments did not make war inevitable, but they raised the risks. Industrial power allowed states to build large armies and modern weapons. Imperialism brought countries into conflict overseas. Nationalism encouraged suspicion of rivals and support for aggressive policies. By the early twentieth century, Europe was dominated by six Great Powers, all of whom feared falling behind the others. This lesson introduces those six powers and explains how they were drawn into two opposing alliance systems. These alliances were meant to preserve peace, but in practice they increased tension and made Europe more unstable. Understanding the strengths, weaknesses and fears of each Great Power is essential for explaining why, in 1914, a crisis in the Balkans escalated into a global war
It is important to think about what we mean when we say 'cause'. What we refer to as background causes are, in the strict sense, not causes, they did not make the First World War inevitable. Instead, in history, we must talk in terms of probabilities. What follows is a set of developments that made war more likely. These developments increased the suspicion, fear and tension between the European powers and therefore made war 'more likely'.
Further, they made a big war more likely. The trend towards larger militaries, industrial capacity and empires made the chances that a short, limited, regional war involving two, maybe three, countries would stay contained slim at best. In 1914 the six most powerful countries in Europe were divided into two opposing sets of alliances. The Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) formed in 1882 and the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) formed in 1907. Although the alliance system appears neat on paper, it was far less stable in reality. Alliances were not automatic promises of war, and many were informal, conditional or misunderstood. Several Great Powers tried to keep their options open, feared their allies as much as their enemies, and worried about being dragged into conflicts they did not control. As historians now emphasise, especially in more recent interpretations, Europe before 1914 was not divided into two rigid camps but into a web of overlapping rivalries, fears and uncertainties.
Further, they made a big war more likely. The trend towards larger militaries, industrial capacity and empires made the chances that a short, limited, regional war involving two, maybe three, countries would stay contained slim at best. In 1914 the six most powerful countries in Europe were divided into two opposing sets of alliances. The Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) formed in 1882 and the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) formed in 1907. Although the alliance system appears neat on paper, it was far less stable in reality. Alliances were not automatic promises of war, and many were informal, conditional or misunderstood. Several Great Powers tried to keep their options open, feared their allies as much as their enemies, and worried about being dragged into conflicts they did not control. As historians now emphasise, especially in more recent interpretations, Europe before 1914 was not divided into two rigid camps but into a web of overlapping rivalries, fears and uncertainties.
The Triple Entente
Great Britain
Great Britain
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Great Britain entered the twentieth century as the richest and most powerful country in the world. It had led the Industrial Revolution, dominated global trade, controlled the largest empire in history and possessed the world’s most powerful navy. Britain was a constitutional monarchy. The king could not make his own laws and as we saw earlier, the franchise had been extended on a number of occasions after 1832 to give all men the right to vote at the start of the 20th century.
Despite its strength, Britain faced serious internal problems. Unemployment was rising, trade unions were organising strikes, and women were demanding the right to vote. The most serious domestic issue was Ireland. By 1914, Ireland was close to civil war, and many British leaders were more worried about events at home than about war in Europe. |
The British Empire in 1914.
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For much of the nineteenth century, Britain followed a policy known as “splendid isolation”, avoiding permanent alliances in Europe and focusing on its empire. Its traditional rivals were France and especially Russia. Britain feared Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which might threaten trade routes and access to India, the most valuable part of the British Empire. For this reason, Britain often supported the weakening Ottoman Empire, not out of loyalty, but to block Russian influence in the region. By the early 1900s, Britain’s priorities began to shift. Colonial disputes with France were largely settled, and Russia was weakened after its defeat by Japan in 1904–05. At the same time, Britain became increasingly concerned about Germany. Germany’s rapid industrial growth and decision to build a large modern navy threatened Britain’s naval dominance, which was essential to the defence of both the British Isles and the empire. This rivalry pushed Britain towards closer cooperation with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907, forming the Triple Entente.
However, Britain’s alliances were loose and uncertain. There was no formal military treaty committing Britain to fight for France or Russia, and many politicians feared being dragged into wars caused by their allies’ ambitions, especially in the Balkans or the Ottoman Empire. British foreign policy before 1914 was cautious and reactive, shaped by overlapping rivalries and by fear of both enemies and allies. This uncertainty helps explain why Britain hesitated during the July Crisis and why its decision to enter the war in 1914 was far from automatic.
However, Britain’s alliances were loose and uncertain. There was no formal military treaty committing Britain to fight for France or Russia, and many politicians feared being dragged into wars caused by their allies’ ambitions, especially in the Balkans or the Ottoman Empire. British foreign policy before 1914 was cautious and reactive, shaped by overlapping rivalries and by fear of both enemies and allies. This uncertainty helps explain why Britain hesitated during the July Crisis and why its decision to enter the war in 1914 was far from automatic.
France
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France entered the twentieth century as a major European power, but one marked by anxiety rather than confidence. France possessed fertile land, a good transport system and the world’s second-largest overseas empire. Paris was the cultural capital of Europe, renowned for its art, science and literature. Politically, France was a republic, ruled by an elected president and parliament.
Yet France also faced serious weaknesses. Its population was smaller than that of both Germany and Britain and, unlike its rivals, it was not growing. Industrialisation had been slower, and French factories produced less than those of Germany. At home, politics were unstable. Trade unions were growing in strength, socialist movements threatened radical change, and memories of earlier revolutions (1789, 1830, 1848, 1871) still shaped political debate. |
(Above – A French cartoon shows a boy looking down on the ‘lost provinces’)
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France’s greatest fear was Germany. The defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 had been a national trauma. Germany had taken the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and the loss became a powerful symbol of humiliation and injustice. Although French governments avoided openly planning a revenge war, the fear of German power dominated military and foreign policy. Much of France’s army planning was defensive, shaped by the belief that another German attack was likely.
To counter Germany, France sought security through diplomacy. It formed a close alliance with Russia in 1894, partly to surround Germany and partly to ensure that France would not face Germany alone. French banks also invested heavily in Russian industry and railways, tying the two countries together economically as well as militarily. However, this alliance was not without risk: France worried that Russian ambitions in the Balkans or against the Ottoman Empire might drag it into a war it did not choose. Relations with Great Britain were also more complex than they appeared. Britain and France had long been imperial rivals, and clashes over colonies in Africa had nearly led to war in the late nineteenth century. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 reduced these tensions, but it was an understanding rather than a binding military alliance. French leaders could not be certain that Britain would fight if war broke out in Europe.
By 1914, France therefore lived with multiple fears: fear of German attack, fear of being abandoned by allies, and fear of being dragged into conflicts caused by others. Its policies aimed at security and survival, but like the other Great Powers, France operated within an unstable international system where caution, alliance loyalty and national pride often pulled in different directions.
To counter Germany, France sought security through diplomacy. It formed a close alliance with Russia in 1894, partly to surround Germany and partly to ensure that France would not face Germany alone. French banks also invested heavily in Russian industry and railways, tying the two countries together economically as well as militarily. However, this alliance was not without risk: France worried that Russian ambitions in the Balkans or against the Ottoman Empire might drag it into a war it did not choose. Relations with Great Britain were also more complex than they appeared. Britain and France had long been imperial rivals, and clashes over colonies in Africa had nearly led to war in the late nineteenth century. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 reduced these tensions, but it was an understanding rather than a binding military alliance. French leaders could not be certain that Britain would fight if war broke out in Europe.
By 1914, France therefore lived with multiple fears: fear of German attack, fear of being abandoned by allies, and fear of being dragged into conflicts caused by others. Its policies aimed at security and survival, but like the other Great Powers, France operated within an unstable international system where caution, alliance loyalty and national pride often pulled in different directions.
Russia
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Russia is the largest country in the world but, in 1900, she was also one of the poorest. She was very rich in minerals - oil, coal, iron ore, gold, etc - but these had not been exploited. The country was almost entirely agricultural, although loans from France had helped Russia to develop some industries. She had a huge population but most people lived in the western half of the country. Russia had great amounts of land but much of it was too cold for farming. She had a long coastline but most of it was frozen for half the year, making sea transport impossible. And Russia was an empire of many peoples, each speaking a different language, from the Finns in the north to the Caucasians in the south and the Poles in the west. All these things made Russia hard to govern as the threat of nationalist independence groups was very real.
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Russia was politically archaic. Feudalism had only finally been ended with the freeing of the serfs in 1861. An autocrat like Louis XVI, Russia's ruler Tsar Nicholas II was a weak man. He was a bad judge of people and was easily influenced by poor advisers. In 1905, partly as a result of the defeat in war to Japan, Russia suffered a revolution which nearly brought down the Tsar. There were many revolutionary groups on the extreme left, anarchists and socialists, (Lenin's Bolsheviks will be important later) who were plotting to seize power. The industrial revolution had begun in Russia and capitalism was expanding quickly. Just as in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, most Russians lived and worked in dreadful conditions. Workers in the towns laboured for up to fourteen hours a day for very low wages. Their homes were crowded and unhealthy. Workers like these had little reason to support the Tsar. Many were ready to rebel against him and join the anarchists and socialists.
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Russia’s foreign policy was shaped by geography and insecurity. Much of its coastline froze in winter, making access to warm-water ports a long-term priority. This drew Russia’s attention towards the Balkans and the weakening Ottoman Empire, especially the Turkish Straits. Russia also saw itself as the protector of Slavic peoples, particularly Serbia. These ambitions brought Russia into direct rivalry with Austria-Hungary, whose own empire included many Slavic nationalities.
At the same time, Russia feared Germany. Germany’s industrial strength and central position in Europe made it a potential threat, especially as Russia’s army was still modernising. Russian leaders believed they needed time to complete military reforms, yet they also worried that backing down in the Balkans would weaken Russia’s status as a Great Power. This created a dangerous tension between delay and decisiveness. Russia’s alliance with France provided financial and diplomatic support, but it also carried risks. French fears of Germany meant that Russia might be encouraged to stand firm even when compromise was possible. Relations with Great Britain had improved by 1907, yet long-standing rivalry in Central Asia and the Middle East meant trust was limited. |
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By 1914, Russia faced contradictory pressures. It feared war before its reforms were complete, but it also feared losing influence if it appeared weak. Protecting Serbia, maintaining Great Power status, avoiding revolution and deterring Germany all pulled Russian policy in different directions. These tensions help explain why Russian mobilisation in 1914 was seen in St Petersburg as defensive, but was interpreted elsewhere as a decisive step towards war.
The Triple Alliance
Germany
In 1914 Germany was less than fifty years old. As we saw, Chancellor Bismarck of Prussia united the German states into a new country - the German Empire. In 1870 the Prussian statesman Bismarck won a war against France, after which he united the many German states into a new and powerful German empire. Germany was the most powerful country on the European continent and had 1870 begun to over take Britain economically. Germany too had her problems. As in all the European countries, many workers were unhappy because their wages were low, food was expensive and working conditions were bad. More and more workers were joining trade unions and organising strikes, hoping that this would force the government to improve their conditions. Many were also joining the Socialist Party which wanted Kaiser Wilhelm to share his power with Germany's parliament. Some Socialists wanted to overthrow him in a revolution. In 1914 the German Socialist Party was the most important in Europe.
In 1914 Germany was less than fifty years old. As we saw, Chancellor Bismarck of Prussia united the German states into a new country - the German Empire. In 1870 the Prussian statesman Bismarck won a war against France, after which he united the many German states into a new and powerful German empire. Germany was the most powerful country on the European continent and had 1870 begun to over take Britain economically. Germany too had her problems. As in all the European countries, many workers were unhappy because their wages were low, food was expensive and working conditions were bad. More and more workers were joining trade unions and organising strikes, hoping that this would force the government to improve their conditions. Many were also joining the Socialist Party which wanted Kaiser Wilhelm to share his power with Germany's parliament. Some Socialists wanted to overthrow him in a revolution. In 1914 the German Socialist Party was the most important in Europe.
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Germany’s relationship with Great Britain deteriorated sharply after 1897, when Germany began to challenge Britain’s naval dominance. German leaders argued that a strong navy was necessary to protect trade and status as a world power, but Britain saw this as a direct threat. The resulting naval arms race deepened suspicion and pushed Britain closer to France and Russia. The loss of Bismarck in 1890 marked a turning point. Under Bismarck, Germany had avoided overseas expansion and relied on careful diplomacy to keep France isolated. When Kaiser Wilhelm II dismissed him (see cartoon), this cautious approach was abandoned. The new leadership pursued a more ambitious foreign policy, including colonial expansion and the building of a large navy.
Germany’s greatest long-term fear, however, was Russia. Russia’s vast population, rapid industrial growth and large-scale military reforms worried German planners. Although Russia was weaker in 1905, German leaders believed that within a few years it would become too strong to defeat. This belief encouraged dangerous thinking about timing: war in the future appeared more threatening than war in the present. Relations with France remained hostile but cautious. France’s desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine was well known, yet German leaders also feared that French policy was shaped by uncertainty. France might act only if supported by Russia and Britain. This uncertainty increased German fears of encirclement, even though Germany itself had strong allies. |
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Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary was both an asset and a risk. Austria-Hungary was Germany’s only reliable ally, yet it was weak, divided and increasingly threatened by nationalism in the Balkans. German leaders worried that if Austria-Hungary collapsed, Germany would be isolated. This fear helps explain Germany’s strong support for Austria-Hungary in crises, even when escalation was possible.
Austria-Hungary
Austria-Hungary was the most fragile of the Great Powers and the one most threatened by events beyond its control. Created by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, it was a dual monarchy ruled by the ageing Emperor Franz Joseph. Although Austria and Hungary were formally equal, the empire was held together by compromise rather than unity.
Austria-Hungary was the most fragile of the Great Powers and the one most threatened by events beyond its control. Created by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, it was a dual monarchy ruled by the ageing Emperor Franz Joseph. Although Austria and Hungary were formally equal, the empire was held together by compromise rather than unity.
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Austria-Hungary was a multi-national empire made up of Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croats, Serbs and others. Many of these groups wanted greater autonomy or independence. Nationalism, which had helped create strong nation-states elsewhere in Europe, was therefore a direct threat to the empire’s survival. Unlike Britain or France, Austria-Hungary had no overseas empire and limited economic growth to offset these internal tensions.
The most serious danger came from the Balkans. Austria-Hungary feared the rise of Serbia, which promoted South Slav nationalism and attracted the loyalty of Slavs living inside the empire. Serbian influence - the Slavic Piedmont - threatened to weaken Austria-Hungary from within. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, intended to strengthen imperial control, instead increased tension both with Serbia and with Russia, Serbia’s most powerful supporter. |
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Austria-Hungary also faced rivalry with Italy, despite being formally allied in the Triple Alliance. Italian nationalists claimed territories within Austria-Hungary, such as South Tyrol and Trieste, which they considered terra irredenta (“unredeemed land”). This meant that Austria-Hungary could not fully trust one of its own allies, further weakening its position. The empire depended heavily on its alliance with Germany, its only reliable supporter. Without German backing, Austrian leaders feared the empire would collapse. Yet this dependence also encouraged risk-taking, since German support reduced the consequences of acting firmly in a crisis.
By 1914, Austria-Hungary was not seeking a European war, but it feared inaction more than action. Leaders believed that failure to respond decisively to Serbian nationalism would lead to further decline and eventual disintegration. This sense of vulnerability and urgency helps explain why a regional crisis in the Balkans escalated into a wider war.
By 1914, Austria-Hungary was not seeking a European war, but it feared inaction more than action. Leaders believed that failure to respond decisively to Serbian nationalism would lead to further decline and eventual disintegration. This sense of vulnerability and urgency helps explain why a regional crisis in the Balkans escalated into a wider war.
Italy
Italy was the newest and least secure of the Great Powers. Unified only in the 1850s and 1860s, Italy remained deeply divided between an industrialising north and a poor, rural south. Although it possessed ambitions of Great Power status, its economy, military and political system were weaker than those of its allies and rivals.
Italy was the newest and least secure of the Great Powers. Unified only in the 1850s and 1860s, Italy remained deeply divided between an industrialising north and a poor, rural south. Although it possessed ambitions of Great Power status, its economy, military and political system were weaker than those of its allies and rivals.
Map of Italian 'irredentism'.
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In the south of Italy, poor peasants made up the bulk of the population and as in Russia many were attracted to the politics of anarchism which promised land redistribution and decentralised control. In the north, around industrial centres in Milan and Turin, working class trades union and socialist movements like in France, Germany and Britain promised egalitarianism and workers' control.
Italy had only extended the franchise to all adult men in 1912 and up to this point governments were formed by factions that assembled around leading liberal politicians who did deals to rule amongst themselves. This process was called ‘trasformismo’ and was designed to keep mass parties, especially the socialists, out of power. The lack of social cohesion in Italy wasn’t helped by the fact that the Pope still refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Italian state which had seized the Papal lands in 1870 and fact that many Italian speaking territories continued remain outside the kingdom. |
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For many Italian nationalists concerns revolved around the incomplete status of the unification project; the ‘terra irredenta’, the lands that had been inhabited by Italian speakers in the former Austro-Hungarian empire. (see map above) These nationalists and the ruling elite as in other European powers, also wanted to set up colonies and build up an overseas empire, but this had been largely disappointing. In 1879 Italy tried to move into Ottoman controlled Tunisia but lost out to France. As a result of this disappointment, Italy joined Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance. In the 1880s, with the secret support of Britain it moved into the horn of Africa with the ultimate ambition of subjugating Abyssinia (Ethiopia) one of the rare still independent African states. First Italo-Ethiopian War broke out in 1895 but Italy was defeated by Ethiopian forces at the Battle of Adawa in 1896. Italy also faced humiliation at the hand of China who refused to grant the same rights to Italy as had been awarded to other European powers. Only after the Boxer Rebellion did Italy get a foothold in Tientsin in 1901.
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In 1911–12, Italy successfully intervened against the Ottoman Empire and seized Libya. This was Italy’s first major military success and appeared to confirm its arrival as a Great Power. However, the consequences were far-reaching and largely unintended. Italy’s attack exposed Ottoman weakness and encouraged the Balkan states to act. Soon after, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece launched wars against the Ottomans, dramatically altering the balance of power in the Balkans. These conflicts increased Serbian territory and confidence, alarmed Austria-Hungary, and intensified rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia. In this way, Italy’s actions helped destabilise the region that would soon become the centre of the 1914 crisis.
Italy’s alliances were therefore highly flexible. Although a member of the Triple Alliance, it did not fully trust Germany or Austria-Hungary and had no strong reason to support Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. Italian leaders were cautious, opportunistic and primarily concerned with Italy’s own status rather than alliance loyalty.
Italy’s alliances were therefore highly flexible. Although a member of the Triple Alliance, it did not fully trust Germany or Austria-Hungary and had no strong reason to support Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. Italian leaders were cautious, opportunistic and primarily concerned with Italy’s own status rather than alliance loyalty.
The relative strengths of the Great Powers in 1914
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Activity - In groups of six (one person per country) discuss and complete the following questions together:
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Extras and extension
Ian Kershaw - To Hell and Back - Chapter 1 on Europe before 1914 and the causes of WW1
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In the opening chapter of To Hell and Back, Ian Kershaw sets the scene for Europe before 1914, showing a continent that was powerful, confident, and yet deeply unstable. He explains how nationalism, imperial rivalry, social tension and rapid economic change created a world that appeared prosperous but was fragile beneath the surface. Rather than presenting war as inevitable, Kershaw highlights uncertainty, risk and missed chances, helping readers understand why Europeans were shocked by what followed.
Kershaw is one of Britain’s leading historians, best known for his work on modern Germany. His clear, balanced style makes complex ideas accessible, making this chapter an excellent starting point for understanding how Europe drifted towards catastrophe. |
Christopher Clark – The Sleepwalkers
The lecture below is by Christopher Clark (text here), one of the most influential historians currently writing about the origins of the First World War. He is best known for his book The Sleepwalkers, which challenged the older idea that one country was mainly responsible for starting the war. A lot of what I have written in this unit is based on my reading of this major work.
The lecture below is by Christopher Clark (text here), one of the most influential historians currently writing about the origins of the First World War. He is best known for his book The Sleepwalkers, which challenged the older idea that one country was mainly responsible for starting the war. A lot of what I have written in this unit is based on my reading of this major work.
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Clark argues that Europe’s leaders did not deliberately plan a world war. Instead, they made a series of decisions during crises, often under pressure, uncertainty and fear. Each decision made sense on its own, but together they pushed Europe into catastrophe. This interpretation places strong emphasis on chance, miscalculation and unintended consequences, rather than inevitability.
In this lecture, Clark summarises his main ideas in an accessible way. It is particularly useful because it helps you see how long-term factors (such as nationalism, imperialism and alliances) interacted with short-term decisions in 1914. Watching it will deepen your understanding of why the First World War broke out and why historians still debate it today. |
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BBC - The Great War+
The video opposite is from a classic 1960s BBC production, the first major attempt to produce a television documentary about the war. This episode provides a country by country overview of 1914 that is worth watching. The people participating in the series were as close to the war of 1914, as we are to the 1960s film. Although very dated the series has the advantage of having interviews with participants when they were still relatively young. In the last few years there have been many fantastic resources produced to commemorate 100 years since the war. Why not watch some of them? |
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