Lesson 4 - Was appeasement the right policy?
The policy of appeasement was the policy of making concessions to the dictatorial powers in order to avoid conflict, as carried out by Anglo-French foreign policy during the 1930s.
|
Activity 1 - Why appeasement?
Consider the reasons given for appeasement in the diagram opposite. Identify examples of political reasons, economic reasons, cultural reasons and military reasons. Appeasement became indelibly associated with Conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Appeasement was a controversial policy at the time. It is still controversial today. There are two main views: |
• It was the wrong policy because it encouraged Hitler. Chamberlain’s critics say that it simply encouraged Hitler’s gambling. They claim that if Britain or France had squared up to him at the start, he would have backed off. Peace would have been secured.
• It was the right policy because Britain was not ready for war. Chamberlain’s defenders say it was the only policy available to him. They say that to face up to Hitler Chamberlain had to be prepared to take Britain into a war. All the evidence available to Chamberlain told him that Britain was not ready. Public opinion was against it - his own civil service advisers had told him this. Important countries in the empire were against it. The USA was against it. And most importantly, Britain’s armed forces were not ready. They were badly equipped and had fallen far behind the Germans.
Activity 2 - Consider the following sources. To what extent do they support the view that appeasement at Munich bought the UK valuable time?
|
|
|
In 1938, Britain produced only around 2,000 military aircraft; by 1940, this number had risen to nearly 8,000, including over 4,000 fighters such as the Hurricane and Spitfire. The Royal Air Force expanded significantly in this period, increasing the number of operational fighter squadrons from around 35 in 1938 to over 50 by the outbreak of war. The extra year also allowed for the rapid construction and deployment of the Chain Home radar network, which proved vital in detecting incoming Luftwaffe raids. Defence spending more than doubled between 1938 and 1940, enabling investment in anti-aircraft guns, air raid precautions, and industrial rearmament. Through the shadow factory scheme, British industry began producing weapons and aircraft at scale, with companies like Rolls-Royce and Vickers playing key roles. Additionally, the Military Training Act of 1939 brought in conscription and swelled army numbers. Without the breathing space created by appeasement, Britain would have entered the war significantly less prepared for the aerial conflict that defined the early years of the struggle.
Activity 3 - Contrast these sources. How do they provide different contemporary views of the policy of appeasement?
|
|
Conclusion on the causes of WWII
|
|
|
Historiography: The Causes of the Second World War
Historians have long debated the origins of the Second World War. Was it the inevitable result of the First World War, the work of Hitler alone, or a failure of the western democracies? Three main traditions outlined in our previous lessons help us understand these debates.
1. Long-term inevitability – the “20 Year Truce” - Many historians argue that the First World War solved little and created new problems. The Treaty of Versailles left Germany resentful, Italy angry over a “mutilated peace,” and eastern Europe fragmented. Economic instability and the Great Depression added to this sense of crisis. Marshal Foch famously said in 1919: “This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20 years.” Alan Sharp: Versailles created unresolved problems, making conflict likely. Winston Churchill: spoke of a “Thirty Years’ War” running from 1914 to 1945. But others argue that by the late 1920s Europe was stabilising, and that a second war only came because of Hitler’s ambitions.
Guiding question: Was WWII inevitable because of the problems left by WWI, or did it depend on Hitler?
2. Hitler’s War – planner or opportunist? - Traditional accounts after 1945 saw Hitler as the main cause. His aims were clear: destroy Versailles, unite all Germans, and gain Lebensraum in the east. Documents like the Hossbach Memorandum (1937) show him discussing war as a solution to Germany’s needs. Intentionalists (e.g. Hugh Trevor-Roper, Eberhard Jäckel): Hitler had a long-term plan for war and racial empire. Functionalists/Structuralists (e.g. Hans Mommsen, Tim Mason): Hitler responded to pressures. For Mason, economic crisis forced Germany to plunder neighbours; Hitler was more opportunist than planner. A.J.P. Taylor (1961): Hitler was an ordinary statesman following traditional German aims; war came about through accidents and miscalculations.
Guiding question: Was Hitler following a clear blueprint, or was he an opportunist reacting to circumstances?
3. The “Guilty Men” Thesis – appeasement and responsibility - In 1940, Michael Foot and others published Guilty Men, blaming Britain’s leaders for failing to confront Hitler earlier. Churchill agreed: in The Gathering Storm (1948) he called WWII “the unnecessary war.” Historians in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Martin Gilbert, Richard Gott) condemned appeasement as cowardly. Revisionism from the 1960s changed this view. After cabinet papers were released under the 30 Year Rule, historians understood the constraints Britain faced. Correlli Barnett, Maurice Cowling: Chamberlain was realistic; Britain lacked resources to fight earlier. John Charmley: defended appeasement as rational — better to avoid a ruinous war unless Hitler proved impossible to contain. R.A.C. Parker: still argued appeasement failed; other options, like an alliance with the USSR, might have stopped Hitler.
Guiding question: Was appeasement cowardly and disastrous, or was it a rational policy in difficult circumstances?
Conclusion - For most scholars today, the truth combines elements of all three. Hitler’s ambitions were decisive, but the weaknesses of the post-1919 settlement and the failures of appeasement also mattered.
Historians have long debated the origins of the Second World War. Was it the inevitable result of the First World War, the work of Hitler alone, or a failure of the western democracies? Three main traditions outlined in our previous lessons help us understand these debates.
1. Long-term inevitability – the “20 Year Truce” - Many historians argue that the First World War solved little and created new problems. The Treaty of Versailles left Germany resentful, Italy angry over a “mutilated peace,” and eastern Europe fragmented. Economic instability and the Great Depression added to this sense of crisis. Marshal Foch famously said in 1919: “This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20 years.” Alan Sharp: Versailles created unresolved problems, making conflict likely. Winston Churchill: spoke of a “Thirty Years’ War” running from 1914 to 1945. But others argue that by the late 1920s Europe was stabilising, and that a second war only came because of Hitler’s ambitions.
Guiding question: Was WWII inevitable because of the problems left by WWI, or did it depend on Hitler?
2. Hitler’s War – planner or opportunist? - Traditional accounts after 1945 saw Hitler as the main cause. His aims were clear: destroy Versailles, unite all Germans, and gain Lebensraum in the east. Documents like the Hossbach Memorandum (1937) show him discussing war as a solution to Germany’s needs. Intentionalists (e.g. Hugh Trevor-Roper, Eberhard Jäckel): Hitler had a long-term plan for war and racial empire. Functionalists/Structuralists (e.g. Hans Mommsen, Tim Mason): Hitler responded to pressures. For Mason, economic crisis forced Germany to plunder neighbours; Hitler was more opportunist than planner. A.J.P. Taylor (1961): Hitler was an ordinary statesman following traditional German aims; war came about through accidents and miscalculations.
Guiding question: Was Hitler following a clear blueprint, or was he an opportunist reacting to circumstances?
3. The “Guilty Men” Thesis – appeasement and responsibility - In 1940, Michael Foot and others published Guilty Men, blaming Britain’s leaders for failing to confront Hitler earlier. Churchill agreed: in The Gathering Storm (1948) he called WWII “the unnecessary war.” Historians in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Martin Gilbert, Richard Gott) condemned appeasement as cowardly. Revisionism from the 1960s changed this view. After cabinet papers were released under the 30 Year Rule, historians understood the constraints Britain faced. Correlli Barnett, Maurice Cowling: Chamberlain was realistic; Britain lacked resources to fight earlier. John Charmley: defended appeasement as rational — better to avoid a ruinous war unless Hitler proved impossible to contain. R.A.C. Parker: still argued appeasement failed; other options, like an alliance with the USSR, might have stopped Hitler.
Guiding question: Was appeasement cowardly and disastrous, or was it a rational policy in difficult circumstances?
Conclusion - For most scholars today, the truth combines elements of all three. Hitler’s ambitions were decisive, but the weaknesses of the post-1919 settlement and the failures of appeasement also mattered.
Activity 5 - The Abyssinia 1935 Role Play.
|